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v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985)
INTRODUCTION

The problem of intoxicated drivers has reached tragic proportions in the United States. Half of all highway deaths involve alcohol.1 Traffic accidents involving drunk drivers kill approximately
25,000 persons each year2 while another 700,000 are injured.3 Fifty
percent of all Americans will at some time be involved in an alcohol-related accident." The economic costs associated with this
human loss and suffering are predictably high, estimated at $21 to
$24 billion per year.5
In response to these staggering losses, citizen groups have demanded stricter laws;' Congress and all fifty state legislatures have
responded. 7 However, even the strictest laws cannot accomplish
their intended purpose without adequate enforcement. As many as
ten percent of all drivers on weekend nights meet the legal definition of intoxication.8 Yet a drunk driver's chances of being stopped
by the police 9 are estimated to be as low as one in 2,000.10
Marion Willard was a drinking driver who was stopped by the
police.1 1 Although the officer knew Willard had been drinking, he
allowed Willard to continue on his way. Within twenty minutes
1. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT]; see also Leo, One Less for the Road?, TIME MAG., May 20, 1985, at 76.
2. Federal Legislation to Combat Drunk Driving Including Nat'l Driver Register: Hearings on S. 2158 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1982) (statement of Diane K. Steed, Deputy
Adm'r, Nat'l Highway Safety Admin.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2158]. Another
estimate places the figure at 28,000 deaths annually. Friedrich, Seven Who Succeeded, TmE
MAG., Jan. 7, 1985, at 41.
3. Blank, Drinking-andDying-On America's Highways, READER'S DIG., Sept. 1985, at
53.
4. Barlas, What You Can Do to Stop Drunk Drivers, READER'S DIG., Nov. 1985, at 91.
5. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 1, at 76; Friedrich, supra note 2, at 41; Making It Tougher
to Drink and Drive, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 1984, at 23.
7. Friedrich, supra note 2, at 76; see also Making It Tougher to Drink and Drive, supra
note 6, at 23.
8. Hearings on S. 2158, supra note 2, at 66. The director of one state public safety department suggests that one out of 100 drivers on weekend nights is "absolutely blitzed, on
the verge of comatose." Leo, supra note 1, at 76.
9. "Police" is used throughout this discussion to refer to any governmental traffic law
enforcement unit, whether that of a city, county, or state agency.
10. Barlas, supra note 4, at 91.
11. Everton v. Willard, 426 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), aff'd, 468 So. 2d 936
(Fla. 1985).
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Willard was involved in an accident in which the driver of another
3 the Florida Supreme
car was killed.12 In Everton v. Willard,"
Court refused to impose liability on the officer-and therefore on
the county employing him-holding that governmental entities
may not be held liable for discretionary decisions made by a police
officer absent a duty owed beyond that owed to the public at large.
A police officer's choice of arrest, detention, or release of an individual was held to be a discretionary decision."
Everton was one of seven sovereign immunity cases decided in
April 1985."5 Those decisions severely limited an injured citizen's
right to sue governmental bodies. In effect, the legislative waiver of
sovereign immunity was invalidated for governmental actions
deemed discretionary by the court. These actions include building
inspection,16 prison administration, 1 7 and enforcement of animalcontrol ordinances' 8 and of drunk-driving laws.' 9
The purpose of this Note is to examine the application of the
"discretionary decision" and "special duty" doctrines in drunk
driving situations. The duty to arrest also will be examined in light
of the public policy concerns behind governmental immunity.
II. Everton v. Willard
Although drunk driving is a problem that has been presented to
the Florida Legislature for solution in recent years, Everton
brought it before the state's highest court. More importantly, the
case gave new life to the arguments that have revolved around the
centuries-old doctrine of sovereign immunity.
A.

The Facts

Early on the morning of July 22, 1979, Pinellas County Sheriff's
Deputy C.W. Parker stopped Willard for a traffic violation.2 0 Although Parker knew, both by his observations and Willard's own
12.
13.
14.
15.
Huhn,
Carter
1985);
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Everton, 426 So. 2d at 998.
468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985).
Id.
Rodriguez v. City of Cape Coral, 468 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1985); City of Daytona Beach v.
468 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1985); Duvall v. City of Cape Coral, 468 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1985);
v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1985); Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929 (Fla.
Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 912.
Reddish, 468 So. 2d at 929.
Carter, 468 So. 2d at 955.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 936; Duvall, 468 So. 2d at 961; Huhn, 468 So. 2d at 963.
Everton, 426 So. 2d at 998.
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admissions, that Willard had been drinking, he only gave Willard a
citation for an improper U-turn and allowed him to drive away.
Not more than twenty minutes later, the vehicle Willard was driving collided with a car driven by Renee Trinko. She was killed; a
passenger in her car, Azor Everton, was seriously injured.2 1
Trinko's father and Everton filed suit against Willard, Deputy
Parker, the Sheriffs Department, and Pinellas County. The Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit dismissed the counts of
the complaint which sought damages from Parker and his employers, ruling that police officers must be allowed free exercise of the
discretion "which lies at the very heart of the policy of law
22
enforcement.
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.2 The court declined to find liability in the officer's exercise of discretion, noting
that police discretion is essential to the planning and implementation of law enforcement.2 This decision conflicted with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's decision in Huhn v. Dixie Insurance
Co. 25 in which municipal liability was found in a strikingly similar
fact pattern. Because of this conflict, the supreme court accepted
review and held that the decision to arrest or detain a person is a
basic, discretionary function of government. In the absence of a
special duty of care, there can be no liability for an officer's exercise of such discretion.2"
B. Background
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was recognized in Florida as
early as 1888,2' and was the law until 1973. In that year, the legislature, under authority of the Florida Constitution, 8 partially
waived the tort immunity of the state, its agencies, and its subdivi21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1004.
24. Id. at 1003-04.
25. 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
26. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 937.
27. See McWhorter v. Pensacola & A.R. Co., 5 So. 129 (Fla. 1888). A complete discussion
of the doctrine's foundation and history in Florida law is provided in Note, Sovereign Immunity Trilogy: Commercial Carrier Revisited But Not Refined, 10 FLA. ST. UL. REv. 702
(1983). See also Comment, Sovereign Immunity-Revisited But Still Not Refined, 12 FLA.
ST. UL. REv. 401 (1984).
28. The pertinent section reads: "Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit
against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." FLA. CONST. art.
X, § 13.
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sions.29 Six years later in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County,30 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that certain "discretionary" (or "planning") functions of governmental bodies remained exempt from suit.3 1 However, "operational" functions were
not to be protected; they could stand as a basis for suits against
governmental entities.3 2 This distinction led to confusing and often
contradictory results in the lower courts.3 3 The supreme court has
sought on numerous occasions to clarify the application of the discretionary/operational analysis.3 4
Nevertheless, at the time of Everton the appellate courts did not
agree on the definition of "discretionary" and "operational" functions and therefore differed as to their application. The Second
District Court in Everton held that a police officer's choice of arrest or release of a drunk driver involved discretionary, planninglevel activity and was not subject to suit.3 5 Eighteen months later
the Fifth District Court in Huhn rejected the Everton rationale
and found that such a decision "was not the exercise of a discretionary governmental function. 3 s6 In Huhn, the plaintiff was found
37
to have a cause of action against the governmental body.
In an attempt to clarify this area of the law, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed several cases based on its jurisdiction over
conflicts among the appellate courts.3 8 In effect, the supreme
court's "clarification" partially reinstituted sovereign immunity,
contrary to the policy expressed by the legislature and the modern
trend of allowing suits against governmental bodies.
C. Rationale
In Everton and six other cases" decided the same day, the supreme court took a firm stance in opposition to lawsuits against
29. Ch. 73-313, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 768.28
(1985)).
30. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
31. Id. at 1022.
32. Id.
33. See Note, supra note 27, at 702, 710-15; Comment, supra note 27, at 401-02, 410-15.
34. See Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983); Perez v. Department
of Transp., 435 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1983); City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082
(Fla. 1982); Ingham v. Department of Transp., 419 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1982); Department of
Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982).
35. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1003-4.
36. Huhn, 453 So. 2d at 75 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 77.
38. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
39. See supra note 15.
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governmental entities. The court emphasized that the legislature's
waiver of sovereign immunity "created no new causes of action, but
merely eliminated the immunity which prevented recovery for
common law torts committed by the government. ' 40 Under this
analysis, only those injuries resulting from activities for which
there was a duty of care at common law could lead to recovery
from a governmental body.
After requiring a common law duty of care, the court stated that
the methods chosen by a government in law enforcement are a part
of its "discretionary power . . .[which] is a matter of governance,
for which there never has been a common law duty of care."4 ' The
court reasoned that the discretionary power afforded a police officer on the street is the same as that of a prosecutor or judge. Just
as the decision whether to prosecute or imprison an individual is
2
not subject to suit, so is a decision regarding arrest.'
The court found that the only possible exception to this rule
would be a situation involving a special relationship between the
victim and the governmental entity.4 3 In the landmark case of
Schuster v. City of New York," such a special relationship gave
rise to a duty of care. In Schuster, a young man was killed by an
unknown assailant after assisting police in the capture of a notorious criminal. The New York Court of Appeals found that the city
of New York owed "a special duty to use reasonable care" to protect a police informant who appeared to be endangered as a result
of his cooperation with the police.'8 In contrast, the Everton court
reasoned that a police officer who made a traffic stop did not assume a special duty to everyone on the roads. The officer had a
general duty to protect the public, but this did not meet the
Schuster standard for liability."
In sum, the court found that the decision to arrest or release a
drunk driver is a discretionary, judgmental choice inherent in the
government's ability to set law enforcement policy. Where there is
only a general duty to protect the public at large, rather than a
Schuster special duty to an individual, no liability will attach to
the officer's decision.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 914; see also Reddish, 468 So. 2d at 932.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 938 (quoting Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 919).
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 939.
Id. at 938.
154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 537.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 938.

172

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:167

The court noted that this reasoning was consistent with its holding in Wong v. City of Miami.47 In that case, several city police
officers were assigned to guard merchants' property during the Republican National Convention."s After the Mayor ordered the officers removed, rioters severely damaged property in the area. The
court refused to "second-guess" the police chain of command and
recognized that withdrawal of officers is a tactic often used to relax
tensions in disturbed areas. 4s The supreme court held that the city
was not liable because the freedom to choose appropriate strategy
and tactics without fear of lawsuits is necessary for the exercise of
municipal police power.5 0 Like Wong, the court reasoned, Everton
involved a police decision not amenable to judicial review. If financial responsibility for the outcome of such decisions is to be placed
on the government and therefore on the taxpayers, the legislature
must indicate clearly its intent to do so.1
D. Dissent
Everton and its companion cases drew sharp dissents.5 2 The dissenters protested that the insistence on a common law duty of care
was in fact almost a complete abrogation of the waiver of sovereign
immunity.5 3 Justice Ehrlich pointed out that "[alt common law,
the sovereign was immune from suit, thus the question of whether
or not duty existed was moot, and never litigated."' 4 To say that
all decisions involving discretion are immune from suit goes too
far, the dissenters argued; "it would be difficult to conceive of any
official act . . . that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a
nail."55 The majority was in fact adopting a long-rejected view that
47. 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
48. Id. at 133.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 134.
51. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 939.
52. Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 923 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); 468 So. 2d at 926 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting); Reddish, 468 So. 2d at 933 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting), 934 (Shaw, J., dissenting);
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 939 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); Carter, 468 So. 2d at 957 (Ehrlich, J.,
dissenting); 468 So. 2d at 958 (Shaw, J., dissenting); Duvall, 468 So. 2d at 961 (Ehrlich, J.,
dissenting), 962 (Shaw, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 468 So. 2d at 964 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting);
468 So. 2d at 965 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
53. See supra note 52. "The series of decisions we issue today reflects the near total
nullification of the legislative waiver of sovereign immunity." Everton, 468 So. 2d at 941
(Shaw, J., dissenting).
54. Trianon, 468 So. 2d at 924 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
55. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 944 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d
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the government should be liable only for activities in which private
individuals also engage. 6
The dissenters stated that the government should retain its immunity from suit, not in the case of "discretionary" decisions, but
in situations involving "non-justiciable political" questions.5 7 The
courts are not required to determine whether a drunk driving law
should be enacted; that is the job of the legislature.5 8 When that
policy is set, however, the courts are responsible for hearing suits
arising from its implementation.5 9 In cases like Everton, the dissenters argued, policy has been set by the legislature.6 0 Several options have been provided for dealing with intoxicated drivers, 61 but
"[lietting the drunk stay on the road is not an alternative."' I Deputy Parker did not have the authority to turn a blind eye to a
driver's intoxication, and therefore the Sheriff's Department
should have been held liable for the "highly predictable" result of
the deputy's failure to arrest Willard. 3
Further, Justice Ehrlich distinguished Wong."' Deputy Parker,
he suggested, was not making a policy-level decision about strategy
and allocation of police resources when he released Willard.65 The
policy decision had been made; Deputy Parker's responsibility was
to enforce the legislature's decision.6 6 The dissenters believed that
the legislature, through the passage of section 768.28, Florida Stat352, 357 (Cal. 1968)); see Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (Mass. 1984). This
point has been advanced by many writers. See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 H~Av. L. REV. 209, 222 (1963).
56. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 942 (Shaw, J., dissenting). According to Justice Shaw, this
restrictive view of sovereign immunity was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), but was tacitly
accepted by the Everton majority. Id.
57. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
58. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
59. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
60. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting), 948 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice
Shaw applauded the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' decision in Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. 1984), which emphasized that police officers are not
responsible for setting policy but are responsible for implementing legislative policy.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 948.
61. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting). An officer confronted with an
intoxicated person has the legislatively mandated options of arrest, FLA. STAT. § 316.193
(1985), protective custody, id. § 396.072, or taking the individual to his home or to a health
facility, id. §§ 396.072, 856.011.
62. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 939.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 940.
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utes,6 7 had been quite specific in its intent to subject governmental
entities to this type of suit, and they urged that liability be
imposed. 8
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Everton court held that there must be a duty to protect the
victim if the officer and his governmental employer are to be liable
for his decisions regarding that victim. 9 At common law, the court
noted, no such duty was generally found where discretionary policy
decisions were made. Only when a "special relationship" existed
between the victim and the government would the courts find liability. 0 Further, a police officer did not stand in such a duty-imposing relationship to each individual member of the public; his

duty ran to the public as a whole.7 1 Even though harm to a citizen
might be prevented by reasonable law enforcement action, there
was no duty of care; the officer was not required to act. This conclusion was based on a long line of precedents, 2 but it begs the
important issue. The question is not "Is there a duty?" but
"Should there be a duty for an officer to act?" As Dean Prosser
pointed out, "duty" is merely a conclusion that, for whatever policy reasons, a person should be able to expect a certain type of
protection. 73 Society's needs must be looked to in order to determine whether a police officer should have a duty to arrest a drunk
driver.
One commentator has suggested that two factors led to subjecting governmental bodies to suit: the need to encourage the efficiency of a growing bureaucracy in meeting self-set goals, and the
ability of such a large institution to spread the cost of injuries
throughout society.74 He noted that, as a government's size in67. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1985).
68. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting), 953-955 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 938.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 938-39; see, e.g., South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855); Trautman v.
Stamford, 350 A.2d 782 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975).
73. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984); see also
Riss v. New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Note, Municipality Held to Have No Duty to Provide Police Protection to Individual Members of the
Public, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 646 (1969).
74. Wangerin, Actions and Remedies Against Government Units and Public Officers for
Nonfeasance, 11 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 101, 102 (1979).
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creases, public liability must also expand.7 5 Another writer has
presented four more factors which courts were actually addressing
when, under the guise of the discretionary/operational analysis,
they determined the presence or absence of a governmental duty of
care.7 6 These factors were the character of the plaintiff's injury, the
existence of alternative solutions, the ability of a judicial proceeding to evaluate the officer's actions, and the effect of suits on the
governmental entity and its administration." In light of these factors, the question "Should there be a duty to arrest the drunk
driver?" must be answered in the affirmative.
A.

Efficiency in Meeting Governmental Goals

Sovereign immunity was established in a time when governments were much smaller than today's wide-reaching bureaucracies. 78 At that time, governments operated more efficiently in the
absence of individual suits against the state. 79 However, governments in modern society have massive bureaucracies which serve
to isolate high-level decision-makers from day-to-day realities. It
has become increasingly necessary to prod these bureaucracies into
carrying out governmental goals. 80 Suits against an agency help insure that its leaders know what their line officers are doing and
that they instruct those officers concerning proper actions. If
subordinate officers are not working to implement specific governmental goals, the government should be held liable for the subordinates' nonfeasance. The result of such liability will be increased
governmental efficiency. 81
When an officer stops an intoxicated motorist, the government's
goal of stopping drunk driving is plainly served by requiring the
officer to remove the motorist from the road, whether through arrest, protective custody, or another procedure provided by the legislature. The alternatives do not include "[letting the drunk stay
on the road."82 The legislature has formulated several options for
dealing with intoxicated drivers; to find liability in this situation
75. Id. at 110. However, liability should not be extended to a point where its costs deter
necessary governmental functions. Id.
76. Jaffe, supra note 55, at 219.
77. Id.
78. See Wangerin, supra note 74, at 101-02.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 102.
81. Id. at 117-18.
82. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940.

176

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:167

would encourage high-level police officials to insure that their subordinates follow legislative directives.8 3 As Everton illustrated, to

do otherwise is to imply an exception in the statute and allow
drunk drivers to continue with the permission of a police officer.
Sounder reasoning is found in Irwin v. Town of Ware.8 4 There,

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found a municipality
liable for a police officer's failure to remove a known drunk driver
from the road. Based on facts similar to those in Everton, the Massachusetts court stated that "the policy and planning decision to
remove such drivers ha[d] already been made by the Legislature."8 The police officer was not acting in a discretionary manner,
but "carrying out . . . previously established policies or plans."8 67
8
Liability in such a case assured that set policies were carried out.

Conversely, the Everton decision allows police agencies to disregard their line officers' nonimplementation of set policies. One
commentator has posited hypotheticals which illustrate the illogic
of Everton when carried to its extreme.8 8 If a police officer knows a
crime is taking place, whether by personal observation or through
a third-party report, Everton suggests that there is no duty to intervene; no civil liability attaches to the officer because of his failure to stop the criminal activity.8 9 Such a result can hardly be seen
as advancing governmental policies. Liability is needed to ensure
that the laws are enforced.90
B.

Spreading Costs

A major goal in allocating tort liability is the spreading of
costs. 9 1 Logically, those who benefit from a service should bear the
83. Wangerin, supra note 74, at 116. For a discussion arguing that the allocation of accident costs shapes behavior, see G. CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-129 (1970).
84. 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984).
85. Id. at 1299.
86. Id. (quoting Whitney v. Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Mass. 1977)).
87. Wangerin, supra note 74, at 118.
88. Note, supra note 73, at 650-51.
89. This "no-duty-to-interfere" reasoning is found in a long line of cases. See supra note
72 and accompanying text.
90. Wangerin, supra note 74, at 117-18. "Government is supposed to accomplish the
goals it sets for itself; whatever judicial means promote that end are appropriate." Id. at
134-35.
91. 'Id. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1982). "The principal of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct." Id. at 657.
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costs of providing that service. The public receives the benefit of
92
police activities; the public should bear its costs.
As Justice Shaw stated, "[tihe choice is whether the tort victim
should bear the full cost of the injuries or whether society at large,
through its government, should bear the cost of torts committed in
the scope of governmental activities." 3 When the legislature chose
to waive sovereign immunity, loss-spreading became the norm.
Justice Shaw referred to hearings before the House Judiciary Committee which indicated that the cost of compensating governmental tort victims is a "legitimate cost of government" which the people must bear.94
In Everton, a vast number of people benefitted from the operations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Department. Yet the loss
from a tortious action in those operations was allowed to fall on a
small group of victims. Reasonable attempts at risk-spreading
would have led to a finding of governmental liability. 5
C.

The Characterof Injury

Professor Jaffe has suggested that "the character and severity of
the plaintiff's injury" is a factor to be considered in placing the
loss resulting from a governmental tort.9 6 He notes that writers
and theorists in this area have not given adequate attention to this
factor.9 7 When the interests of plaintiffs and defendants are balanced, some types of injury cry out for a remedy more than
others.9 8 Cases of governmental nonfeasance which result in loss of
life or limb should receive more sympathy and are more deserving
of compensation than those yielding only economic harm. 9 Cases
involving personal injuries and death present a much stronger
foundation for expanded liability than cases involving mere finan92. Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failureto Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L. REV. 821,
834 (1981). Actuarially, some mistakes are inevitable. These costs should be taxed to the
public as are other expenses associated with providing police service. Id.
93. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 949 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at n.13.
95. See Note, supra note 92, at 834. "[Police mistakes] should not be borne solely by the
unfortunate few upon whom the injuries fortuitously fall, for governmental defendants generally possess superior loss-bearing capacity." Id.; see also Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1194 (1977).
96. Jaffe, supra note 55, at 219.
97. Id. at 225.
98. Id.
99. Wangerin, supra note 74, at 132.
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cial losses. 100 The nature of the injury is an important distinction
between Everton and its companion case, Trianon Park Condominium Association v. City of Hialeah.1 01 Trianon involved condominium units which were damaged by leaking roofs. 102 In Everton,
one person was killed and another seriously injured.1 03 These were
not speculative or economic losses but severe personal injuries. In
Everton, the character and severity of the plaintiffs' losses clearly
cried out for compensation.
D. Feasibility of Alternative Remedies
The literature also suggests that where there are other ways to
solve a problem governmental liability should not be imposed. 1T In
fact, the intoxicated driver in Everton was a defendant. However,
such a suit may not provide a real remedy. Many drivers may be
uninsured or unable to pay damages. As a "deep pocket," the government may be the only defendant able fully to compensate a seriously injured plaintiff.
Further, as the dissenters in Everton pointed out, the injuries in
this type of case result from a police officer failing to perform his
duty.1 0 5 The appropriate remedy for failure to enforce the law is a
writ of mandamus.1 06 However, as a practical matter, mandamus
cannot be used to encourage police officers to remove drunk drivers
from the road. In cases like Everton, a writ of mandamus can only
be sought after the fact. Only a systematic avoidance of duty is
normally remedied by mandamus. This situation is not amenable
to an after-the-fact solution through the writ process. By holding
the police liable, the harm to the victim will be redressed and officers will be encouraged to take action regarding drunk drivers
before accidents occur.
100. Id.
101.

468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).

102.
103.

Id. at 914.
Everton, 426 So. 2d at 998.
Jaffe, supra note 55, at 227-28.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting), 947 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

104.
105.
106.

See, e.g., Walbolt & Casey, Extraordinary Writs, in FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE
TRIAL 690 (4th ed. 1983). A writ of mandamus is appropriate even in discretionary
action if a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. Thus, mandamus could be used to address
a clearly erroneous failure to arrest under the Everton majority's "discretionary function"
analysis. Id.
BEFORE
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
E.

Justiciability

In rejecting police liability, the Everton court relied heavily on
the separation of powers doctrine. Commentators have suggested
that sovereign immunity is appropriate in police-conduct questions
because courts lack the authority to formulate policy for the execu10 7
tive branch.
However, Justice Shaw pointed out that the constitutional and
statutory provisions governing suits against Florida governmental
bodies provide such authority.0 8 The juxtaposition of these provisions "mandate[s] that tort suits against the state be heard by the
judicial branch."' 1 9 Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution
provides for the separation of governmental powers, but it leaves
an exception for such nonseparation as "expressly provided
herein." 10 The provision allowing suits against the government is
such an "expressly provided" exception. For the court to override
the legislature's adoption of procedures for suits against governmental entities truly usurps legislative power.
Even when a waiver of immunity has been adopted by a legislative body, courts may still refuse to decide political questions
which are held to be inherently nonjusticiable." While the court
may be unable as a political matter to determine the appropriateness of adopting a particular policy with regard to drunk driving,
that was not the issue in Everton. The legislature had formulated
the policy and provided alternative methods of meeting its goals.
The nonpolitical, justiciable question involved in the suit had been
whether Deputy Parker was negligent in performing his duties." 2
107. See, e.g., Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Re-defining the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 720, 726-27 (1983). In Everton, Justice Overton emphasized
that only the legislature could impose a "new duty of care"; the judiciary could not "establish fit] by judicial fiat." Everton, 468 So. 2d at 939.
108. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J., dissenting). See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13; art.
V, § 1; art. I, § 21; FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985).
109. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
110. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. The section reads in full: "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging
to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein." Id.
111. Justice Shaw suggests this is the current application of Commercial Carrier.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
112. Further, the court did not have to address which of the legislatively mandated alternatives, such as arrest or protective custody, Deputy Parker should have chosen. Such a
question may be nonjusticiable. The decision, however, not to take any of the prescribed
alternatives should be open to a determination of negligence.
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Such a question can be addressed by the courts under Florida's
system of government.
F.

Effect of Suits on Governmental Entities

Sovereign immunity has found great support in the supposed effect of suits on the public coffers. 113 Although the Florida Supreme
Court glossed over this point in Everton,114 it has figured prominently in other cases involving police discretion11'

One contention is that exposing municipalities to liability for the
acts of their police officers would drain cities' resources and undermine their ability to carry out essential governmental programs."1
Such arguments always seem to be advanced when large institutions seek to avoid liability for negligence. A similar argument was
offered against the removal of tort immunity for charities. Although there is no longer a general immunity for hospitals or charitable organizations, these groups still function. The specter of
crippling judgments against governmental entities is often raised,
but it is found to have little substance when sovereign immunity is
removed. Speaking for the Arizona Supreme Court, Justice Hays
said in Ryan v. Arizona:1 1 7 "We are

. . .

told that not only will the

public treasury suffer but government will come to a standstill because its agents will be afraid to act. We can't but recall the dire
predictions attendant to the [judicial abolishment of governmental
tort immunity]. Arizona survived!" The Florida Legislature took
into account the possible adverse effects of lawsuits on municipal
budgets when it made insurance provisions for governmental entities;1 18 cities may obtain liability insurance in any amount they
choose. Further, the legislature forbade the awarding of punitive
damages against governmental bodies and capped compensatory
damages at $100,000 per person and $200,000 per incident." 9 The
113. See, e.g., Bermann, supra note 95, at 1176. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was
first recognized in Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). A major factor in the
Men of Devon decision was the lack of public funds from which to pay a judgment. Id.
114. "[T]he elected representatives in the legislative branch ... may create this new
duty of care and place this fiscal responsibility on the governmental entity and its taxpayers, rather than having the judiciary establish this new duty by judicial fiat." Everton, 468
So. 2d at 939. The district court had, however, mentioned the danger of "increasingly larger
jury verdicts" as a factor leading to its decision. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1000.
115. E.g., Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860; see also Note, supra note 107, at 727-29.
116. See, e.g., Stigler v. Chicago, 268 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1971).
117. 656 P.2d 597, 598 (Ariz. 1982).
118. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(13) (1985). This section is discussed at length in Justice Shaw's
dissent in Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
119. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1985).
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legislative branch has taken steps to advance two policies: the permissibility of suits against government entities and the protection
of government revenues. Because the legislature has made the decision to allow damages up to certain limits, it is not up to the
judiciary to further protect the public coffers.
G.

Other Policy Considerations

Everton established that governmental entities cannot be sued
for their police officers' failure to arrest or detain a known drunk
driver. The court indicated that "sovereign authorities ought to be
left free to exercise their discretion and choose the tactics deemed
appropriate without worry over possible allegations of negligence." 12 0 Yet it is clear that police officers do not have complete
discretion over their choice of tactics. They cannot perform unlawful searches and seizures, they cannot hold a suspect incommuni" ' Police
cado, and they cannot commit other civil rights violations.12
officers can be held liable for other inappropriate actions, and
Everton can be seen as a problem of line-drawing. When an officer
chooses to disregard legislatively authorized procedures, this choice
should be subject to judicial review.
An important point to remember is that the plaintiff, in a case
like Everton, if allowed to present his case, must prove all the elements of applicable tort law; causation, negligence, and damages
would need to be shown for liability to attach. Only the legislatively determined duty would be established as a matter of law.
The governmental defendant would be allowed to show that the
officer's decision not to remove the intoxicated driver from the
road was appropriate, given the circumstances, his training and experience, the constraints within which the officer must work, and
other factors.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Everton exempts municipalities from liability for their police officers' failure to take drunk drivers off the road because such a
decision is judicially considered a discretionary, policy-making governmental function. Such governmental immunity from suit usually rests upon several factors: efficiency in meeting governmental
goals and cost-spreading along with analyses of the character of
120.
1970)).
121.

Everton, 468 So. 2d at 939 (quoting Wong v. Miami, 237 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla.
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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the plaintiff's injury, the feasibility of alternative remedies, the
separation of governmental powers, and the fiscal effects of suits
on governmental bodies. When Everton is examined in light of
these factors, it is clear that governmental immunity is not appropriate in cases involving police options in dealing with drunk drivers. Far from defeating governmental goals, the finding of liability
in such circumstances would help increase governmental efficiency,
spread costs among those who profit from police protection, advance legislative policies, and preserve the separation of powers.
Because of the serious social costs of drunk driving, governments
must assume responsibility for the way their police officers deal
with this problem. Liability for an officer's negligence in failing to
remove a drunk driver from Florida's highways should be imposed.
Donna Sessions Waters

